As an immediate reply, meanwhile, I should like to make a remark or two about what is perhaps the central issue raised in the foregoing Comment. This is whether Price's dispositional reduction, or anyone's dispositional reduction can adequately render the act of thinking. Alternatively, the question could, I think, be stated in more presently-favoured language. One could ask whether statements about universals, thoughts, concepts, or ideas can be logically deduced from dispositional statements not containing these "mentalistic" terms. If one is (...) inclined to prefer this more lengthy formulation one may then take this to be my meaning; whenever "dispositional solution" or "dispositional reduction" is mentioned one may translate it into this longer form. (shrink)

One of the standard ways of proving the consistency of additional hypotheses with the basic axioms of an axiom system is by the construction of what may be described as ‘inner models.’ By starting with a domain of individuals assumed to satisfy the basic axioms an inner model is constructed whose domain of individuals is a certain subset of the original individual domain. If such an inner model can be constructed which satisfies not only the basic axioms but also the (...) particular additional hypothesis under consideration, then this affords a proof that if the basic axiom system is consistent then so is the system obtained by adding to this system the new hypothesis. This method has been applied to axiom systems for set theory by many authors, including v. Neumann, Mostowski, and more recently Gödel, who has shown by this method that if the basic axioms of a certain axiomatic system of set theory are consistent then so is the system obtained by adding to these axioms a strong form of the axiom of choice and the generalised continuum hypothesis. Having been shown in this striking way the power of this method it is natural to inquire whether it has any limitations or whether by the construction of a sufficiently ingenious inner model one might hope to decide other outstanding consistency questions, such as the consistency of the negations of the axiom of choice and continuum hypothesis. In this and two following papers we prove some general theorems concerning inner models for a certain axiomatic system of set theory which lead to the result that as far as a fairly large family of inner models are concerned this method of proving consistency has been exhausted, that no essentially new consistency results can be obtained by the use of this kind of model. (shrink)

Reproduced from Robert J.C. Young, Torn Halves. Pages: 256. ISBN: 0-7190-477-3 ; 0-7190-4776-5. Price: 14.99 ; 40.00.

Orthologic is defined by weakening the axioms and rules of inference of the classical propositional calculus. The resulting Lindenbaum-Tarski quotient algebra is an orthoimplication algebra which generalizes the author's implication algebra. The associated order structure is a semi-orthomodular lattice. The theory of orthomodular lattices is obtained by adjoining a falsity symbol to the underlying orthologic or a least element to the orthoimplication algebra.

In this essay I contrast Freud’s account of mourning in Mourning and Melancholia to that of Merleau-Ponty in Phenomenology of Perception. In suggesting a somatic as well as a psychic response, Merleau-Ponty, I argue, more accurately accounts for the ways in which we experience loss and why, contrary to Freud’s suggestion, mourning’s work is never completed.

Escape from Leviathan (EfL) is a first attempt at explaining a somewhat complex philosophical theory of libertarianism. The theory is far from being as clear as it has subsequently become possible to make it. Consequently, most reviews have misunderstood it to varying degrees. What is striking is the great confidence with which some of these reviews assume they have completely understood it and refuted it. This is odd because it does not seem entirely reasonable to suppose that EfL’s errors are (...) quite as obvious and naïve as the reviews often assume. And only a slightly more careful reading of the text might have disabused them of their misapprehensions. With the article about to be discussed, we have another clear example of this phenomenon. But what is particularly interesting about it is that it does not itself fully understand the basic conception of liberty that most libertarians assume. And as this is, strangely, not that uncommon even among libertarian philosophers, it is certainly worth responding to as clearly as possible. (shrink)

Book Information Understanding Truth. By Soames Scott. Oxford University Press. New York. 1999. Pp. ix + 268. Cloth.

A nonnegative interger is called a number, a collection of numbers a set and a collection of sets a class. We write ε for the set of all numbers, o for the empty set, N(α) for the cardinality of $\alpha, \subset$ for inclusion and $\subset_+$ for proper inclusion. Let α, β 1 ,...,β k be subsets of some set ρ. Then α' stands for ρ-α and β 1 ⋯ β k for β 1 ∩ ⋯ ∩ β k . For (...) subsets α 1 ,..., α r of ρ we write: $\alpha_\sigma - \{x \in v \ (\nabla i) \lbrack i \in \sigma \Rightarrow x \in \alpha_i\rbrack\} \text{for} \sigma \subset (1, \ldots, r),\\ s_i = \sum \{N(\alpha_\sigma) \mid \sigma \subset (1,\ldots, r) \& N(\sigma) = i\}, \text{for} 0 \leqq i \leqq r$ . Note that α 0 = v, hence s 0 = N(v). If the set v is finite, the classical inclusion-exclusion principle (abbreviated IEP) states $(a) N(\alpha_1 \cup \cdots \cup \alpha_r) = \sum^r_{t=1} (-1)^{t-1} s_t = \sum_{o \subset_+\sigma \subset (1,\ldots,r)}$ (b) N(α' 1 ⋯ α' r ) = ∑ r t=0 (-1) t s t = ∑ (-1) N(σ) N (α σ ). In this paper we generalize (a) and (b) to the case where α 1 ,⋯, α r are subsets of some countable but isolated set v. Then the role of the cardinality N(α) of the set α is played by the RET (recursive equivalence type) Req α of α. These generalization of (a) and (b) are proved in § 3. Since they involve recursive distinctness, this notion is discussed in § 2. In § 4l we consider a natural extension of "the sum of the elements of a finite set σ" to the case where σ is countable. § 5 deals with valuations, i.e., certain mappings μ from classes of isolated sets into the collection λ of all isols which permit us to further generalize IEP by substituting μ(α) for $\operatorname{Req} \alpha$. (shrink)

I am grateful to the commentators for their deep engagement with the issues raised in my paper. They raise a number of important challenges and questions about the use of frailty i...

In recent years, a revisionist process focused on logical positivism can be observed, particularly regarding Carnap's work. In this paper, I argue against the interpretation that Kuhn's The Structure of Scientific Revolutions having been published in the International Encyclopedia of Unified Science, co-edited by Carnap, is evidence of the revisionist idea that Carnap "would have found Structure philosophically congenial". I claim that Kuhn's book, from Carnap's point of view, is not in philosophy of science but rather in history of science. (...) It could also explain the fact that, despite his sympathetic letters to Kuhn as editor, Carnap never refers to Kuhn's book in his work in philosophy of science. (shrink)

Extensively classroom-tested, Possibilities and Paradox provides an accessible and carefully structured introduction to modal and many-valued logic. The authors cover the basic formal frameworks, enlivening the discussion of these different systems of logic by considering their philosophical motivations and implications. Easily accessible to students with no background in the subject, the text features innovative learning aids in each chapter, including exercises that provide hands-on experience, examples that demonstrate the application of concepts, and guides to further reading.

Consequence is at the heart of logic, and an account of consequence offers a vital tool in the evaluation of arguments. This text presents what the authors term as 'logical pluralism' arguing that the notion of logical consequence doesn't pin down one deductive consequence relation; it allows for many of them.

The aim of this paper is to show the relationship between the normative outlook and political philoso- phy of traditional societies on the one hand, and the crises of governance and leadership in contemporary African Societies, particularly subSaharan states, on the other. Although there are quite some differences in the quality of leadership and governance among sub-Saharan African states because of the different political and economic circumstances, this part of the globe taken as a whole remains underdeveloped in terms of (...) having the will to institute and maintain stable polities with responsive, responsible and efficient governance. (shrink)

Der Aufsatz schildert den platonisierenden Antipsychologismus welchen Bolzano, der junge Brentano, Twardowski, Meinong, der Husserl der Logischen Untersuchungen, Frege, der Russell der Jahrhundertwende und der junge Wittgenstein philosophisch vertraten, und versucht eine soziologische und ideologiekritische Interpretation sowohl dieser Einstellung als auch derjenigen des traditionellen Psychologismus des achtzehnten Jahrhunderts. Der Platonismus des neunzehnten und zwanzigsten Jahrhunderts wird als ein Ausdruck fiir - oder vielmehr als eine Reaktion gegen - den Verfall der klassischen burgerlichen Werte aufgefaBt. In Wittgensteins Tractatus spielen Elemente sowohl (...) eines platonisierenden Antipsychologismus wie auch eines relativistischen, verhaltensphanomenologisch orientierten Antipsychologismus eine Rolle: dieses Werk wird also als eine grelle Manifestation des Uberganges von der klassischen zur spatbiirgerlichen Weltanschauung, als ein Obergang vom Glauben an ewige Wahrheiten zur Hinnahme einer Gebrauchs-Theorie der Bedeutung und deren Konsequenzen interpretiert. (shrink)